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morbidity rate of the present sec­
tion, nor was the neonatal mortal­
ity rate increased by the number of 
previous sections. 
The risk to a normal  infant 
weighing 2500 Gm. or more, being 
born to a mother with existing but 
only potential obstetric pathology 
in elective section, is 12 per 1000. 
Sterilization after cesarean sec­
tion is unnecessary. When it is 
done, it is either due to the sacri­
fice of medical integrity to the un­
warranted assumption of a "social 
indication," or is a result of the 
failure to employ modern surgical 
technics. 
Four hundred and eighteen pa­
tients had a repeat section after 
this s tudy had been  completed 
( Table A}, with a 3.1 o/a maternal 
morbidity rate and no maternal 
mortality. One uterus ruptured at 
32 weeks in a patient who had had 
1 previous classical cesarean sec­
tion. The entire group is comprised 
of a total of 1630 repeat sections 
without maternal mortal i t y  and 
1208 intact uteri, at the time of 
subsequent section, out of 1212 
subjected to pre vious  incisions. 
There was 1 inadequate scar in a 
third section, which required hys­
terectomy at ensuing section. The 
four ruptured uteri in the entire 
series all followed 1 previous class­
ical section and all occurred before 
38 weeks gestation. 
Addenda 
TABLE A. REPEAT CESAREAN SECTIONS NOT INCLUDED IN ST UDY 
No. previous 
cesarean sections No. cases 
1 236 
2 134 
3 39 
4 6 
5 1 
6 2 
TOTALS 418 
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What Must the Cancer Patient Be Told? 
JOHN J. LYNCH, S.J. 
CATHOLIC PHYSICIANS in generalhave no quarre l  with  that
paragraph in our Ethical and Reli­
gious Directives �hich reads as 
follows: "Everyone has the right 
and duty to prepare for the solemn 
moment of death. Unless  it is 
clear, therefore, · that a dying pa­
tient is already well prepared for 
death, as regards both temporal 
and spiritual affairs, it is the phy­
sician's duty to inform, or to have 
some responsible person inform, 
him of his critical condition." Such 
are. the values at stake in the face 
of approaching death that it is not 
too difficult to discern the doctor's 
primary obligation in these circum­
stances. Whatever doubts may be 
occasioned by the explicit wording 
of the directive are amply clarified 
by the comments of Fr. Gerald 
Kelly, S.J ., in Medico-Moral Prob­
lems, II, 7-9, and in LINACR E 
QUARTERLY, August 1955, 95-97. 
But not so evident perhaps is the 
answer to a further question which 
is not expressly provided for in the 
Directives and which is being asked 
with increasing frequency. Should 
the cancer patient be told the na­
ture of his disease? Is there any 
moral principle which obliges a 
doctor to reveal his diagnosis of 
oancer, or is he justified in with­
holding that information even if 
the patient asks the question direct? 
Some doctors have solved the 
problem for themselves in universal 
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terms, and maintain that the fact 
of cancer should never be revealed 
to a patient, even if a lie is neces­
sary in order to conceal the truth.1 
To my knowledge, only one pro­
fessed ethician ( not a Catholic) 
has defended the other extreme 
and insisted that all diagnostic data 
belongs to the patient by strict 
right and cannot licitly be withheld 
from him.2 Catholic moralists who 
have considered the problem �dopt 
a more conservative position, and 
prefer not to speak a priori of 
either alternative in terms of strict 
obligation. They exclude the lie, 
of course, from among the legiti­
mate means of concealing the truth. 
But they do make provision for a 
choice according to the circum­
stances of individual cases. And 
the ultimate decision - whether 
tactfully to reveal the truth or to 
withhold it by some legitimate eva­
sion - they leave to the doctor's 
prudent judgment as to what is 
best for the individual patient.3 
One gets the impression, how­
ever, that doctors are not always 
1 For one sampling of varied medical 
opinion on this question, cf. GP, Sep­
tember 1954, 7 4-84. 
2 Joseph Fletcher, Morals and Medicine, 
Ch. 2, "Medical Diagnosis: Our Right 
to Know the Truth." 
3 John A. Goodwine in America, 28 May 
1955, 236-38; Gerald Kelly, S.J., in Linacre Quarterly, August 1955, 96, and 
Medico-Moral Problems, II, 8; Jules Pa­
quin, S.J., Morale et Medecine, 409; G. 
Payen, S.J., Deontologie Medicale, 125-
26. 
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entirely satisfied with such a solu­
tion. Some seem to suspect the 
moralist of straddling the issue and 
of foisting upon others a responsi­
bility which is properly his own. 
They press for a less ambiguous 
answer, a more automatic rule-of­
thumb, apparently forgetful of the 
fact that the norm proposed by 
moralists for this situation is the 
very one which physicians instinct­
ively follow in ordinary circum­
stances, to the mutual satisfaction 
of both themselves and their pa­
tients. 
How does the doctor usually de­
cide which details of diagnosis to 
share with his patient and which 
to withhold? Invariably he has 
recourse to the patient's own best 
interests. Because, for example, 
their intel l igent  cooperation is 
clearly necessary for successful 
therapy. the cardiac, the diabetic, 
the epileptic, and the victims of 
other curable or controllable ail­
ments are instructed in some detail 
as to the nature of their afflictions 
and in the precautions which must 
be taken to cope with them. Any­
thing less would be professionally 
inexcusable, since it is altogether 
clear in such cases that to keep the 
patient in ignorance would be to 
defeat the immediate purpose of 
the docto r -pat ient  relationship, 
namely, the cure or control of dis­
ease. And in accordance with the 
same norm, other details are fre­
quently not disclosed, either be­
cause they would be of no particu­
lar benefit to the patient or be­
cause, through misunderstanding 
or exaggerated concern on his part, 
therapy would be thereby more 
hindered than helped. In any case 
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it is the physician who takes the 
responsibi1ity of deciding how 
much of his diagnosis to reveal 
and how much to withhold - al­
ways with the best interests of the 
patient at heart. Patients who have 
confidence in their doctors, and 
who are able to judge their own 
cases objectively, would be among 
the first to agree that adherence to 
some such norm is ultimately to 
their best advantage and most 
compatible with their reasonable 
wishes. 
Consequently it would seem en­
tirely consonant both with good 
medical practice and with sound 
morality to express some such prin­
ciple as this with regard to the 
patient's right to the whole truth: 
the patient's reasonable claim to 
diagnostic data is not absolute, but 
is qualified by his own presumed 
intention to receive maximum bene­
fit from medical treatment. In other 
words, he rightfully expects and is 
entitled to such information from 
his physician as can be judged 
truly necessary or useful for his 
own total well-being. On the other 
hand, he is presumed not to desire 
. knowledge which  would  prove 
more detrimental than beneficial. 
Any demand for such knowledge 
may be considered unreasonable 
and may be evaded, if possible, by 
any legitimate means. 
Sometimes the only possible dif­
ficulty in applying this principl 
would be a physician's blindness to 
certain objective values. Thus on 
the suppos i t ion  of approaching 
death, for example, all other con­
siderations yield to the spiritual 
good of the patient. to his right 
and obligation to prepare ade-
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quately for eternity. For Catholics 
this means ordinarily the oppor­
tunity of receiving the last sacra­
ments while still in possession of 
their rational faculties. For non­
Catholics likewise it means a chance 
to conjure with the realization of 
death's approach and to prepare 
themselves in whatever m a n ner 
their own religious convictions and 
God's grace may suggest. No other 
consideration of itself outweighs 
the spiritual importance of realiz­
ing that the time for repentance, 
for acts of virtue, for grace and 
merit, is drawing to a close. Chief­
ly for that reason, because the pa­
tient's highest spiritual interests so 
clearly require an awareness of 
approaching death, moralists can 
speak without hesitation in terms 
of-obligation on the doctor's part 
to see to it that his patient is pro­
vided with that knowledge. 
But when it comes to the ques­
tion merely of identifying for a 
patient the precise nature of his 
illness, the issue is not always so 
clear-cut. The difficulty then lies 
in determining whether the pa­
tient's welfare is truly best served 
by imparting that information or 
by withholding it. For on the one 
hand, once the patient is aware 
that his illness is fatal. it is not 
likely that ignorance of its more 
specific nature will have serious 
harmful effects on his spiritual or 
material well-being. ( Or if cancer 
is curable, therapy will usually not 
be hindered merely because some 
euphemism is substituted for the 
word "cancer.") On the other 
hand, it is not always possible to 
predict just what psycholo gical 
effect, good or bad, knowledge will 
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have. Some take the realization of 
cancer courageousl y  and even 
cheerfully; others may tend to de­
spondency and despair. For some 
the dread word would be a cruci­
fixion; for others, knowing the 
worst can be a distinct mental re­
lief, a comfort of sorts, and per­
haps a welcome i nstrument of 
grace and merit. Seldom can one 
be sure beforehand just what re­
action will occur. It is because of 
the uncertainties involved in most 
such cases that moralists cannot 
speak in universal terms of obliga­
tion on a physician's part to reveal 
a diagnosis of cancer. That deci­
sion would appear to be usually a 
question of the preferable thipg to 
do, and not necessarily a matter of 
moral right and wrong. 
Hence a doctor's strict moral 
duty to inform the patient would 
seem to include only ( 1 ) informa­
tion necessary to the patient in 
order to insure successful therapy. 
and ( 2) foreknow ledge in proper 
time of approaching death. The 
decision to communicate further 
diagnostic details need not be dic­
tated by a sense of grave obliga­
tion, though it may suggest itself 
as the more humane thing to do in 
some c i rcumstance s. When an 
emotionally well-balanced victim of 
cancer expresses a sincere and 
rational desire to know the truth---­
especially if he be a person of 
strong faith....-it can prove psycho­
lo.gically advantageous to all con­
cerned that the truth be told him. 
If no request for the information 
is made, it is safe to presume that 
the patient either prefers not to 
know or is not particularly inter­
ested; and since he has no obliga-
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tion to inform himself of that fact,
the physician is justified in main�
taining silence. And if a doctor has
positive reason to believe that only
harm would result from the know�
ledge, then evasion of the issue by
any legitimate means is the proper
procedure. 
In every case the norm should
be the same, namely, the individual
patient's best interests insofar a:S
they are humanly discernible. But
the ultimate decision should not be
the same in every case, since what
is good in this regard for some will
be bad for others, and vice versa.
Hence one thing which doctors
should avoid is the application of
one and the same prefabricated
decision to every case they en�
counter. Rather they should make
a reasonable attempt to predeter�
mine whether the truth about can�
cer will be of benefit or harm to
the individual patient, and on this
altruistic basis formulate an ad hoc
judgment. 
The moral principle involved is 
altogether clear: act always in the
best interests of the patient. I ts
proper application to this problem
depends upon a doctor's correct
sense of values and his prudent
discernment. 
* * * * 
ST. PEREGRINE, THE CANCER SAINT
St. Peregrine (rhymes with terrapin)_ was con
verted by St. Philip, O.S.M. He 
entered the Order of the Servants of Mary in 12
83. Then for 62 years, Peregrine
labored with the sick and did incredible, volun
tary penance in religious life in
reparation for a tempestuous youth. God perm
itted a cancerous growth to gnaw 
away at one of his legs. Amputation was dee
med necessary. A miraculous cure 
the night before the scheduled surgery removed
 all trace of the malady. 
His feast day is May 2 and God's power has
 been manifested in sudden and 
miraculous cures affected through Peregrine to 
win him the title of official patron 
of cancer victims. For centuries Europeans ha
ve been loyally devoted and have
confidence in this Saint. 
In America the true mission is not necessarily
 to heal all cancer victims but
rather ta teach the value of pain so that their s
ufferings may not be wasted, with 
no profit to them. Discouragement should not f
ollow if St. Peregrine does not 
miraculously effect a cure. Who knows? Maybe
 God is saving that miracle for 
someone whose faith is less strong . .. 
Further information may be had by writing to The
 St. Peregrine Center, 3121 W. 
Jackson Blvd., Chicago 12, Illinois. Booklets, statue
s, medals, prayer leaflets, and 
holy cards are available. 
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:l-ewer malpractice Claimo-
1ha Our
American Wa�­
Condenf /or :Jrealmenf 
Do YOU R
ECALL the front page 
story about the $33,700.00
malpractice verdict for a steriliza­
tion operation? The jury believed
the patient's claim that he only
consented to a circumcision.1 Did
you hear of the $100,000.00 mal�
practice claim for removing a 
woman's right breast on an indi�
cation of cancer? She claimed she
consented only to a bladder and
rectal operation.2 You probably
read of the $250,000.00 claim for
removing a woman's left ovary
and other rep roductive organs.
She claimed she consented only
to the removal of her right ovary.
3 
These cla i m s, and others,
prompted the request for a review
of American law on patient's con­
sent. Will this review lessen the
number of malpractice claims?
We all hope so. Our review of
American law properly begins 
with the Declaration of Inde­
pendence. It expresses our Ameri�
can philosophy of law. Its philos�
ophy has bearing. not only on the
1The Denver Post, Friday
, Oct. 31.
1952. On appeal to the 
Colorado Su­
preme Court, the case was
 reversed and
sent back for new trial as t
o one of the
doctors. 
2Denver District Court, Ci
vil Action
A-70645. Summary judgmen
t entered fo1 
the surgeon. 
3The Denver Post, Septembe
r 26, 1952.
The jury rejected her claim. D
enver Dis· 
trict Court, Civil Action A-85379. 
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T. RABER TAYLOR, A.B .. LLB.
rights of the citizen against the
state, but also and equally, on the
rights of citizens between each
other. It has application to ques­
tions involving the rights of pa­
tient and physician. Our Ameri�
can philosophy of law is expressed
in these familiar word_s:
"We bold these Truths to be self
­
evident, that all Men are creat
ed
equal. that they are endowed by th
eir
Creator with certain i n a l i e n a b
l e
Rights, that among these are L
ife, 
Liberty. and the Pursuit of Hap
pi­
ness. That to secure these Righ
ts,
Governments are instituted amo
ng 
Men, deriving their Lust Powers fro
m
the Consent of the Governed; * *
 *" 
You spot the three key philo�
sophical and ideological con�
cepts--
First, All men are created and
endowed by their Creator with
inalienable Rights.
Second, Man's right to life is
Creator endowed.
Third. Consent is given to Gov�
ernment to secure this Right to
life. 
These concepts indicate to doc-"
tors that physicians, like govern�
ment, are instituted to make se�
cure man's right to life. To us
they also point that. like govern�
ment, physicians derive their au�
thority from man's consent. Our
American law, therefore, starts
with the premise of self�determi�
nation. If a physician judges a 
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